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We present an experimental realization of a quantum digital signature protocol which, together with a standard
quantum key distribution link, increases transmission distance to kilometer ranges, three orders of magnitude
larger than in previous realizations. The bit rate is also significantly increased compared with previous quantum
signature demonstrations. This work illustrates that quantum digital signatures can be realized with optical
components similar to those used for quantum key distribution and could be implemented in existing quantum
optical fiber networks.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.93.012329
I. INTRODUCTION
Signature schemes are widely used in electronic commu-
nication to guarantee the authenticity and transferability of
messages. Transferability means that a signed message is
unlikely to be accepted by one recipient and, if forwarded,
subsequently rejected by another recipient [1]. This property
distinguishes signature schemes from message authentication
schemes, which do not guarantee transferability. Transferabil-
ity is closely related to nonrepudiation; message repudiation
would mean that a sender can successfully deny having sent a
message they really did send. The most widespread signature
schemes are the public-key protocols Rivest, Shamir and
Aldeman [2], Digital Signature Algorithm [3] and Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm [4], where security depends
on the computational difficulty of factorizing large numbers or
finding discrete logarithms. Since the security of public-key
schemes is not information theoretic but relies on computa-
tional assumptions, it can be retrospectively affected by future
advances in technology or the discovery of efficient algorithms.
In fact, all of the above schemes are known to be insecure
against an adversary with a quantum computer [5].
The security of quantum digital signatures (QDS) [6,7], on
the other hand, is information theoretic, guaranteed by the laws
of quantum mechanics to be secure against an adversary with
unrestricted computational capabilities. This is a potentially
significant advantage. There also exist unconditionally secure
so-called classical digital signature schemes [8]. In addition to
requiring pairwise secret classical communication channels
(which could be achieved using quantum key distribution,
QKD), the scheme by Chaum and Roijakkers [9] requires
an authenticated broadcast channel (which is a challenging
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Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. Further distribution of
this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the published
article’s title, journal citation, and DOI.
requirement), and the one by Hanaoka et al. [10] is phrased
in terms of a third party, trusted by all participants. Such
assumptions are not straightforward. Also, while pairwise
message authentication can be efficiently implemented with
information-theoretic security using short preshared keys, [11]
this does not enable the implementation of an authenticated
broadcast channel. Quantum signature protocols need neither
an authenticated broadcast channel, nor a trusted third party.
Further, information-theoretically secure secret classical chan-
nels can be generated using QKD. Therefore, even in terms of
required resources, if the secret shared keys are generated using
QKD, QDS schemes are in this sense no more demanding than
the classical unconditionally secure signature schemes.
Although QDS has been successfully realized in the
laboratory between three parties, a sender Alice and two
receivers Bob and Charlie [12,13], the transmission distance
for these realizations was limited to the order of meters due
to the inherent design of these earlier protocols. The earliest
versions of QDS protocols [6,12] also required long-term
quantum memory [14–17] to store the signature states at the re-
ceivers, making full implementation impossible with currently
available technology. Quantum memory is no longer needed
if the recipients directly measure the quantum states sent
by Alice, for example, using unambiguous state elimination
(USE) [18,19], and then store only the classical measurement
outcomes [13,18]. However, these QDS schemes still relied
on a multiport to guarantee nonrepudiation, comprising two
intertwined interferometers controlled locally by Bob and
Charlie. The multiport design required internal delays equal
to the link length between Bob and Charlie, as well as intro-
ducing unavoidable additional high optical loss, restricting the
practical transmission distance to approximately 5 m [12,13].
For QDS to be useful in real-world applications, protocols
which allow for higher transmission rate and greater distance
between parties must be developed and demonstrated experi-
mentally. In this paper we present an experimental realization
of a key part of such a protocol, along the lines of QDS
protocols proposed in Ref. [20]. The paper is organized as
follows. Section II is divided into two subsections, the first of
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which outlines the protocol (which is covered in more detail
in Appendix A), while the second provides an overview of
the experimental system. In Sec. III we present and analyze
the experimental results. Only an outline of the analysis is
given here, with more details given in Appendix B. Section IV
concludes the paper.
II. METHODS
A. Overview of protocol
Signature protocols have two stages, a distribution stage
and a messaging stage. The scheme is established in the
distribution stage, to enable signed messages to be sent and
received in the messaging stage, which is entirely classical
and could occur at any future date. An outline of the protocol
will be presented here with a more complete description in
Appendix A. We will describe how to sign a 1-bit message
m; longer messages may be sent by suitably iterating this
procedure. In the distribution stage, Alice chooses two random
sequences of L phase-encoded coherent states, one sequence
for each possible message, 0 or 1. Increasing the length L
of the sequence will increase the security of the scheme.
The security also depends on other parameters, such as the
mean photon number per pulse |α|2 and imperfections in the
setup [20]. Alice chooses her quantum states randomly from
a known alphabet of nonorthogonal quantum states, in our
case the four phase-encoded states |α〉, |αeipi/2〉, |αeipi 〉, and
|αe3ipi/2〉, relative to a common phase reference. She keeps the
complete classical description of the two sequences secret; this
constitutes her so-called private key. Nonorthogonal quantum
states cannot be perfectly distinguished from each other, so
only Alice can know her full private key. The phase reference
pulse in our implementation is strong, so that tampering with it
could in principle be detected by performing state tomography.
Alice sends one copy of each sequence of coherent quantum
states to both Bob and Charlie, through separate quantum
channels. Bob and Charlie measure the received coherent
states, in our case using quantum USE [13,19,20], ruling out
zero, one or more of the four possible phases for each position
in each sequence of states. Bob and Charlie perform the
measurements by combining the suitably adjusted reference
pulses with the signal pulses using two beam splitters, one for
each nonorthogonal phase pair in the four-state alphabet. Each
detection event eliminates one of the four possible states sent
by Alice. In Fig. 1, the phase of the reference state entering
beam splitter 2 at Bob is set so that he can eliminate the 0 and
pi phases, and the phase at beam splitter 3 is set to eliminate
the pi/2 and 3pi/2 phases. From the detection statistics, one
obtains the conditional probabilities for Bob to eliminate each
of the four states, given that Alice sent a particular state. An
example of this so-called cost matrix is illustrated in Fig. 2(a)
for |α|2 = 0.5.
Bob and Charlie now each have a measurement record for
the sequences sent by Alice. They then both randomly and
independently choose half of their measurement outcomes to
forward to the other recipient. They keep secret from Alice
which measurement outcomes are forwarded and which are
kept. This last step is not implemented in our present setup,
but could be achieved using a standard QKD link. Employing a
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FIG. 1. Experimental setup for kilometer-range quantum dig-
ital signatures. Alice uses a pulsed 850-nm-wavelength vertical
cavity surface-emitting laser (VCSEL) diode to generate coherent
states which are phase encoded using a lithium niobate (LiNbO3)
phase modulator. Alice sends the coherent states through standard
telecommunications optical fiber to the receivers, who then perform
a phase measurement. Sender and receivers are constructed from
polarization-maintaining optical fiber to improve the interferometric
visibility. Polarization routing of modulated signal and unmodulated
reference was carried out using polarization-dependent beam splitters
(PBS) while static polarization controllers (SPCs) corrected for
polarization shift induced in the telecommunications fiber.
(a)
(c)
(b)
(d)
FIG. 2. Experimental results and calculated parameters. In our
experiment, measurement statistics for Bob and Charlie were similar.
(a) Conditional probabilities for unambiguous state elimination by
Bob, with |α|2 = 0.5. These probabilities are used to calculate the gap
g and the required signature length per half-bit. (b) Time required for
Alice to send a half-bit to Bob. (c) The gap achieved in the experiments
is a calculated from both receivers’ cost matrices. (d) The length L
required to prevent forging and repudiation, per half-bit of message,
for a security level of 0.01%. For all subfigures at 500 m, mean
photon number points of 0.1, 0.9, and 1 have been removed. Here,
the combination of count rate and the dead time of the detector led to
nonlinearity in the detection.
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standard QKD link does not affect the maximum transmission
distance or security level of the system, and does not further
complicate the security analysis. This is because it is only used
to secure the classical processing after the coherent states have
been transmitted and measured.
The random forwarding procedure replaces the sym-
metrising multiport in earlier implementations and ensures
that Bob and Charlie obtain the same final measurement
statistics irrespective of what states Alice sends them. This
is true even for the most general cheating strategies by
Alice, which could involve entangled states. A dishonest
Alice could attempt repudiation, that is, deny having sent a
message that she actually did send. If the whole signature
scheme is to have information-theoretic security, then a secret
classical communication channel with information-theoretic
security is needed for forwarding the measurement results,
since otherwise security against repudiation would not be
information theoretic. At the end of the distribution stage, Bob
and Charlie should each be left with different and incomplete
descriptions of the signature sent by Alice, which are kept until
the messaging stage.
In the messaging stage, Alice chooses a message m and
sends it together with her corresponding private key, that
is, the classical description of the corresponding sequence
of quantum states, to the intended recipient, say, Bob. All
communication during the messaging stage takes place over
pairwise authenticated classical communication channels;
quantum communication is needed only in the distribution
stage. To accept the message, Bob checks Alice’s private key
against his measurement record for the message m. He accepts
the message if he finds fewer than Lsa mismatches, where
sa is an authentication threshold and L is the length of the
sequences chosen by Alice.
If Bob wishes to forward the message, he sends the message
together with Alice’s private key to Charlie. Charlie then
checks for mismatches in the same way as before, but applies
a different verification threshold sv , which is larger than sa .
The message is only accepted if there are fewer than Lsv
mismatches. It is important that the threshold for accepting
a message directly from Alice is different from the threshold
for accepting a forwarded message. Otherwise Alice could
repudiate with high probability [6]. Signing a message uses up
the distributed signatures, which cannot be reused.
Here, as for all existing QDS protocols, we assume that none
of the participants are tampering with or eavesdropping on the
quantum channels between other participants. It is expected
this assumption could be removed by using a parameter
estimation procedure analogous to that used in QKD, as has
been shown for a quantum signature protocol using Bennett
and Brassard 1984 states [21]. By declaring (sacrificing) some
of the states in the distribution stage, participants should be
able to estimate the level of eavesdropping, aborting if it is
too high. When considering security against forging by either
Bob or Charlie, one assumes that the other recipient and Alice
are honest, since no protocol can guarantee security if two
of the three parties are dishonest and collude. Similarly, when
considering security against repudiation by Alice, one assumes
that Bob and Charlie are honest.
All pairwise classical communication in the present proto-
col, just as for QKD, must be authenticated. Pairwise message
authentication can in modern cryptography be efficiently
implemented using short preshared keys [22]. It is not, even
in principle, possible to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks
in QKD or QDS schemes unless there has been some prior
interaction between parties. If information-theoretic security
is required, one needs to use an appropriate authentication
scheme for all classical communication [23]. The security
analysis for the QDS protocol implemented here proceeds
much as in Collins et al. [13] and is detailed in Appendix B.
B. Experimental method
The experimental system shown in Fig. 1 shares many
similarities with QKD experiments [24–29]. The sender and re-
ceivers are constructed from 4.4-µm-core-diameter so-called
panda-eye polarization-maintaining fiber [30] that can support
two orthogonal linear polarization modes. Alice generates
850.17-nm-wavelength coherent-state pulses at a repetition
rate of 100 MHz by means of a vertical cavity surface-emitting
laser and an optical attenuator [13]. A lithium niobate phase
modulator is used to encode the phases on weak pulses,
while a strong reference pulse is delayed by half a period
from the encoded states. The signal and reference pulses have
orthogonal linear polarizations and are recombined using a
polarization beam combiner [31] before transmission through
the 9-µm-core-diameter optical fiber quantum channel. The
quantum channel is composed of Corning SMF-28e optical
fiber [32], which is retained within the same laboratory
as Alice, Bob, and Charlie. Short lengths of 4.4-µm-core-
diameter fiber [33] are fusion spliced onto the quantum channel
to eliminate higher order spatial modes [34].
Stresses induced on the quantum channel will introduce
a time-evolving birefringence which reduces the linearity
of the polarizations as they propagate. Bob and Charlie
employ paddle-type static polarization controllers to apply
an opposing birefringence over a short (≈1 m) length of
4.4-µm-core-diameter fiber, returning the states to linear prior
to the measurement step. Future revisions of this system will
employ automatic correction by monitoring the delayed bright
reference pulse.
A polarization beam splitter in each receiver ensures that
the weak signal pulse traverses the delaying path while the
bright reference pulse traverses the short path. The polarization
and intensity of the reference pulses are altered to match the
signal pulse before recombination on a 50:50 beam combiner
where interfere occurs. Commercially available free-running
photon-triggering [35] silicon single-photon avalanche diodes
[36] (Si-SPADs) are employed as detectors, due to their high
single-photon detection efficiency (≈40%) for photons with a
wavelength of 850 nm, a low dark count rate (≈300 counts
per second), and a low afterpulsing probability (≈0.5%)
when compared to semiconductor detectors used at the
telecommunications wavelengths [37,38]. Conveniently these
detectors operate near room temperature, although it should
be noted that superconducting detectors have exhibited much
higher single-photon-detection efficiencies, e.g., 93% [39],
albeit at temperatures of 4 K or less [40], while semiconductor
technologies usually operate near room temperature [36,38].
There have been recent advances in semiconductor detector
technologies for wavelengths around 1550 nm [38], and future
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QDS experiments will likely employ these technologies to
further enhance the transmission range.
The air gaps in each receiver consist of an immobile
launching collimating lens and a collection lens attached
to a linear piezoelectric actuator. The receivers adjust the
relative lengths of their measurement setup to ensure optimum
interferometric visibility (typically greater than 93%). The
receivers’ demodulation systems have a mean attenuation of
6.96 dB.
Detector trigger events are time stamped with a resolution
of 1 ps [41] before analysis of the raw time-stamp information
is carried out by custom software written in MATLAB [42],
which filters events to discard those that occur outside of a
window of ±2 ns centered on the expected arrival time of a
pulse, a process that retains 80% on average of the raw counts
and performs USE. The measurement records are then retained
to allow forwarding of results from Bob to Charlie and vice
versa. This must be done in secret from Alice and could be
accomplished using a channel secured using a one-time pad
with a prestored key which may come from a standard QKD
link between Bob and Charlie.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In Fig. 2, we plot experimental data and parameters for
a range of mean photon numbers |α|2 sent by Alice. When
|α|2 increases, the probability that a forger will be able to
select the correct declaration increases but likewise so does
an honest recipient’s ability to detect mismatches in a fake
declaration. It is therefore nontrivial to determine the optimal
value of |α|2. The gap, g, between the probability for a forger’s
fake declaration to be rejected and the probability for Alice’s
true declaration to be rejected, g = Cmin − ph (see Appendix
B), depends on |α|2. Other experimental parameters, such as
system loss and interferometric visibility, are automatically
taken into account in the cost matrices that are used to
obtain Cmin and the gap g. It can be seen from Fig. 2(c) that
the maximum gap occurs around |α|2 = 0.4 for transmission
distances of 500, 1000, and 2000 m, showing that this value
of |α|2 is the best choice for the sender in this particular
experimental implementation.
For the desired security level, the length required to sign
one half-bit can then be calculated usingP (protocol failure) =
2e−(g/4)2L (see Appendix B). In this paper, we use a security
level of 0.01%. The resulting signature length for each half-bit
is graphed in Fig. 2(d) for varying |α|2. As |α|2 increases, the
length per half-bit dips to a minimum and increases again. For
our experimental data, the maximum value for the gap and the
minimum values for the length are around |α|2 = 0.4.
To further illustrate the measurements by the recipients,
state elimination success rates are shown in Fig. 3. A successful
USE measurement means eliminating any state except the state
Alice sent. On average, the USE success rate is 80% of the
raw count rate. Only a single detection event is required to
eliminate a state, and therefore the success rate is higher than
for unambiguous state discrimination (USD), where one has to
eliminate all possible states except the one sent. The success
rate for USD is typically many orders of magnitude lower
than the time-gated detector count rate [13]. The failure rate
of USE (eliminating the state that was actually sent) depends
FIG. 3. Unambiguous state elimination (USE) success rate at
different transmission distances for Bob. Results for Bob and Charlie
are again very similar so only results for Bob are shown. The failure
rate of USE is on average only 1.7% of the pulse-repetition frequency
and is not plotted. For transmission distance 500 m, points for mean
photon number 0.1, 0.9, and 1 have been removed, since here the
combination of count rate and the dead time of the detector led to
nonlinearity in the detection of events.
on the visibility of the interferometers formed by Alice’s state
preparation and the receiver’s detection setup. In the security
proof we assume that Alice has full control over the failure
rate and so can generate any number of mismatches she likes.
For these experiments, the USE failure rate was on average
1.7% of the pulse repetition rate. Knowing Alice’s repetition
rate and the signature length L required to sign a half-bit
message allows us to calculate the time it would take for Alice
to distribute a signature state sequence for signing one half-bit
using the current system.
In a previous QDS experiment using a mulitport [13], with
a transmission distance of 5 m, the largest gap was found to be
1.20 × 10−6, which occurred for |α|2 = 1. The USE success
rate was 2 × 105 counts per second. For a security level of
0.01%, the length L required to securely sign a half-bit was
found to be 5.0 × 1013, and the estimated time it would take
to securely sign a half-bit was over eight years. In contrast,
for the present setup and a transmission distance of 500 m, the
maximum gap, g = 2.86 × 10−4, occurs at a |α|2 = 0.5, with
a USE success rate of 2.48 × 106. This gap is two orders of
magnitude greater than for the previous short-range system.
The length L per half-bit for this new realization is 1.93 ×
109 for a security level of 0.01%, and the estimated time it
would take to securely sign a half-bit is less than 20 s. As
the transmission distance increases, the time taken to sign one
half-bit naturally increases, but even at 2000 m the time taken
to sign one half-bit is four orders of magnitude smaller than in
the previous experimental demonstrations of QDS.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a QDS test bed that employs tech-
nologies similar to common phase-basis set QKD systems to
overcome the previous limitations on maximum transmission
length and demonstrate signature generation over transmission
lengths up to 2 km—a significant improvement over previous
demonstrations that were limited to a few meters [12,13].
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Removing the cumbersome multiport of previous QDS hard-
ware iterations means that this test bed exhibits significantly
enhanced robustness against environmental disturbances while
simultaneously highlighting a pathway to implementation of
QDS with QKD hardware. Furthermore, compared to previ-
ous implementations of USE-USD QDS [13] this improved
design requires significantly fewer coherent states to sign an
individual half-bit.
The system reported here operates over relatively short
distances when compared to the current maximum transmis-
sion distances achieved for QKD experiments [43]. This is
because quantum signatures are different from QKD both in
functionality, protocol and security analysis. We also note
the increased losses of 2.2 dB km−1 in standard telecom-
munications fiber at the wavelength of 850 nm, selected for
these experiments, as opposed to 0.2 dB km−1 at 1550 nm,
typically used in QKD experiments. Although the protocol
demonstrated in this paper shows a significant enhancement
in transmission distance and message signing rate compared
with previous QDS demonstrations, further improvements in
signature transmission rate, in particular, will be necessary to
fully exploit the potential of QDS.
The recently proposed signature protocol P2 in Ref. [20]
uses standard QKD systems to first generate pairwise shared
keys between all parties. The secret keys are then used to
sign messages. Currently, such schemes seem more efficient
than any proposed quantum protocol that directly signs a
message without first distilling a secret key. Nevertheless,
direct quantum signature protocols, such as the one discussed
in this paper, are still worth investigating, as they may
eventually prove better than signature protocols based on
secret shared keys. For example, direct quantum protocols can
remain secure even if the available quantum channels are too
noisy for practical QKD [21]. Also, the most efficient direct
quantum protocol should intuitively be at least as efficient as
protocols proceeding via first distilling shared secret keys and
then using the shared keys to sign messages. There could also
be other advantages with direct quantum protocols. If quantum
channels of sufficiently high quality are available, then direct
quantum signature protocols should need quantum channels
only between the sender and each recipient, as opposed to
QKD links between each party for protocols similar to P2.
This means that the number of quantum channels scales only
linearly with the number of recipients for direct quantum
signature schemes, as opposed to quadratically for schemes
similar to P2. Compared with work on QKD, very little
work has been done on QDS schemes. This is surprising,
given the wide usage and importance of signature schemes in
modern communication. We are confident that demonstrating
kilometer-range quantum signature schemes, using the same
technical components as QKD, will stimulate wider interest in
developing the next generation of quantum signature protocols
for real-world optical networks.
All data created during this research are openly available
from the Heriot-Watt University data archive [44].
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APPENDIX A: PROTOCOL
The protocol presented in this paper is similar to P1′ from
Ref. [20], but with two important differences. First, we require
Bob and Charlie to record whether each measurement outcome
they hold came directly from Alice or whether it was forwarded
to them by the other recipient. Second, the experiment uses
weak coherent states instead of true single-photon states. This
means that the security proofs presented for protocol P1′ do not
apply, and instead we follow the methods applied in Ref. [13]
for security against individual and collective forging attacks.
The protocol is as follows.
1. Distribution stage
(1) For each future one-bit message k = 0,1, Alice gener-
ates two copies of sequences of coherent states, QuantSigk =⊗L
l=1 ρ
k
l where ρkl = |bkl α〉〈bkl α|, α is a real positive ampli-
tude, bkl ∈ {1,i,−1,−i} are randomly chosen, and L is a suit-
ably chosen integer (the signature length). The state QuantSigk
and the sequence of numbers PrivKeyk = (bk1, . . . ,bkL) are
called the quantum signature and the private key, respectively,
for message k.
(2) Alice sends one copy of QuantSigk to Bob and one to
Charlie, for each possible message k = 0 and k = 1.
(3) Bob and Charlie measure each state received us-
ing quantum unambiguous state elimination (USE) for
{|α〉,|iα〉,|−α〉,|−iα〉}. For every element of each quantum
signature (for k = 0,1), they store which detectors detected
photons; each detector rules out one possible phase state.
They therefore store sets of six numbers (hexaplets) of the
form {k,l′,ak,l
′
0 ,a
k,l′
pi/2,a
k,l′
pi ,a
k,l′
3pi/2}, where 1  l′  L and a
k,l′
φ ∈
{0,1}. Here, ak,l
′
φ = 0 means that no photons were detected at
the ¬φ detector (that is, the phase φ is not ruled out), while
a
k,l′
φ = 1 means that there was at least one photon detected
at the ¬φ detector (that is, the phase φ is ruled out for this
element). By ¬φ detector we symbolize the “not φ” detector.
Note that, due to losses, many of the hexaplets will have
a
k,l′
φ = 0 for all φ.
(4) Once all states have been received and all hexaplets
recorded, Bob and Charlie each independently choose half
(L/2) of their hexaplets and send them to the other participant.
To do this, they use a secret classical channel so that Alice
has no information regarding which participant holds which
hexaplet. Bob and Charlie keep a record of whether a particular
hexaplet came from Alice or whether it was forwarded by the
other recipient.
2. Messaging stage
(1) To send a signed one-bit message m, Alice sends
(m,PrivKeym) to the desired recipient (say, Bob).
(2) Bob checks whether (m,PrivKeym) matches both of
his stored sequences—the one he received directly from Alice
and the one he received from Charlie. In particular, he counts
012329-5
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the number of elements of PrivKeym which disagree with
his stored hexaplets. Therefore, for a given element l of the
signature, if Alice’s declaration was φ, Bob needs to check if
aφ is 0 or 1. If aφ = 1, he registers one mismatch. In other
words, a mismatch is registered whenever Alice’s declaration
for a given element has been eliminated by Bob’s USE
measurement. Bob checks, for each of his stored sequences,
whether the number of mismatches is below saL/2, where sa
is an authentication threshold. Bob accepts the message only
if both of his sequences have fewer than saL/2 mismatches,
i.e., both the sequence received directly from Alice and the
sequence received from Charlie.
(3) To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards to
Charlie the pair (m,PrivKeym) he received from Alice. Charlie
tests for mismatches similarly to Bob, but to protect against
repudiation by Alice, he uses a different threshold. For each
of his sequences—the one received directly from Alice and
the one received from Bob—Charlie checks if the number
of mismatches is below svL/2, where sv is the verification
threshold, with sa < sv . Charlie accepts the message only if
both of his sequences have fewer than svL/2 mismatches.
APPENDIX B: SECURITY
The quantum signature protocol is designed to be secure
against two types of dishonesty: forging and repudiation.
Security against forging requires that any participant receiving
a message will, with high probability, reject a message that did
not originate with Alice. Security against repudiation requires
that, with high probability, Alice cannot make Bob and Charlie
disagree on the validity of her message, i.e., she cannot make
one participant accept and the other reject her message. In
this section we will show that the probabilities of forging and
repudiation decay exponentially in the signature length, L.
Further, we will show that the protocol is robust, i.e., if all
participants are honest, the protocol works and does not abort,
except with a probability exponentially small in L.
For forging one can distinguish different types of malicious
attacks. In individual attacks, the cheating party employs
a strategy separately and independently for each signature
element. In collective attacks, there may be classical corre-
lations between strategies for different signature elements.
Coherent attacks are the most general type; here a cheating
party can employ any type of correlations, including en-
tanglement and measurements in an entangled basis. Note
that the same distinctions apply in principle to repudiation
attempts from Alice. However, when proving security against
repudiation, we will assume that Alice can exactly control
the number of mismatches her signature generates with Bob’s
and Charlie’s measurement outcomes. This covers all types of
attack from Alice and so the distinction between individual,
collective, and coherent attacks is not made. Security is
proven for all types of repudiation attacks, and all types
of forging except coherent forging attacks. We will treat
individual forging attacks in detail. Security against collective
forging attacks then follows because the optimal collective
forging strategy is actually an individual strategy, as argued
in Ref. [13].
1. Model assumptions
Here, as in all previous QDS protocols, we assume that
the quantum channels between participants do not allow
tampering or eavesdropping from a third party. It is expected
that this assumption could be removed by using a parameter
estimation procedure analogous to that used in QKD [21]. By
sacrificing part of the states sent during the distribution stage,
participants should be able to estimate the level of tampering
and eavesdropping.
All pairwise classical communication in the present pro-
tocol, just as for QKD, must be authenticated. Pairwise
message authentication can be efficiently implemented with
information-theoretic security using short preshared keys [11].
Without this authentication, it is not possible, even in princi-
ple, to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks in QKD or QDS
schemes. Thus neither QKD nor QDS can be implemented
without some prior interaction between parties. It is important
to note that pairwise authentication between parties is far
simpler to achieve than an authenticated broadcast channel
and that pairwise authenticated channels do not imply an
authenticated broadcast channel.
2. Security against repudiation
To repudiate, Alice aims to send a declaration (m,Sigm),
which Bob will accept and which Charlie will reject. To do
this, Bob must accept both the elements that Alice sent directly
to him and the elements that Charlie forwarded to him. In order
for Charlie to reject he need only reject either the elements
he received from Alice or the elements Bob forwarded to
him. Intuitively, security against repudiation follows because
of the symmetrization of measurement outcomes performed
by Bob and Charlie using the secret classical channel. Bob
and Charlie perform USE measurements on each of the states
sent to them by Alice so that they hold the L hexaplets
(b1, . . . ,bL) and (c1, . . . ,cL) respectively. We give Alice full
powers and assume that later on, in the messaging stage,
she is able to fully control the number of mismatches her
signature declaration, PrivKeym, contains with the hexaplets
(b1, . . . ,bL) and (c1, . . . ,cL). Call the mismatch rates eB and
eC respectively. The symmetrization process means that Bob
and Charlie will randomly (and unknown to Alice) receiveL/2
of the others’ hexaplets. We show that all choices of eB and eC
lead to an exponentially decaying probability of repudiation.
Suppose Alice chooses eC > sa . In this case, Bob is
selecting (without replacement) L/2 elements from the set
{c1, . . . ,cL}, which contains exactly eCL mismatches with
Alice’s declaration. The number of mismatches Bob selects
then follows a hypergeometric distribution H (L,eCL,L/2)
with expected value eCL/2. For the message to be accepted,
Bob must select fewer than saL/2 errors. The tails of a
hypergeometric distribution can be bounded, using Ref. [45],
to give an inequality with the same form as a Hoeffding
inequality. This enables us to bound the probability that Bob
selects fewer than saL/2 mismatches as
Pr(Bob receives fewer than saL/2 mismatches from Charlie)
 exp[−(eC − sa)2L].
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To repudiate, Alice must make Bob accept the message, which
means that Bob must accept both the part received from
Alice and the part received from Charlie. Since P(A ∩ B) 
min{P(A),P(B)}, the probability of repudiation must be less
than or equal to the above expression and so must also decrease
exponentially.
Now suppose eC  sa . In this case, if eB > sa the above
argument shows that it is highly likely that Bob will reject
the message, so we consider only the case where eB  sa .
Consider first the set {b1, . . . ,bL}. We can use the same
arguments as above to bound the probability of selecting more
than svL/2 mismatches as
Pr(Charlie selects more than svL/2 mismatches from Bob)
 exp[−(sv − eB)2L].
For Alice to successfully repudiate, Charlie must select more
than svL/2 mismatches from either the set {b1, . . . ,bL} or the
set {c1, . . . ,cL}. Using Pr(A ∪ B)  Pr(A) + P(B), we can see
that, for the choice of eB ,eC  sa , we have
Pr(Charlie selects more than svL/2 mismatches)
2 exp[−(sv − sa)2L].
So again, the probability of Alice successfully repudiating
decreases exponentially in the size of the signature. Similar
to that in Ref. [20], Alice’s best strategy would be to pick
eB = eC =
1
2 (sv + sa), in which case
Pr(Repudiation) 2 exp [− 14 (sv − sa)2L]. (B1)
3. Security against individual and collective forging
In order to forge, Bob must make a declaration with fewer than svL/2 errors with the L/2 elements Charlie received directly
from Alice. To bound the probability of Bob being able to make such a declaration, we will follow the cost matrix analysis
performed in Ref. [13]. For a given individual signature element, we define the cost matrix for Bob as a matrix where the rows
correspond to which state Alice sent (| exp(iθ )α〉), while the columns correspond to the detectors D(¬θ ). Each matrix element
Ci,j can be taken equal to the probability that if the ith state is sent, then Charlie’s j th detector clicks. This is because Bob should
avoid declaring a phase that Charlie has eliminated. His cost for making a particular declaration will therefore be proportional to
the probability that Charlie has ruled out this state. When |α|2 = 0.4, and over a distance of 500 m, the experiment gives us the
cost matrix
C =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
8.41 × 10−5 1.48 × 10−3 2.00 × 10−3 1.11 × 10−3
1.15 × 10−3 6.31 × 10−5 1.22 × 10−3 2.84 × 10−3
2.41 × 10−3 1.90 × 10−3 1.53 × 10−4 1.30 × 10−3
1.15 × 10−3 2.77 × 10−3 1.15 × 10−3 4.49 × 10−5
⎞
⎟⎟⎠. (B2)
From this matrix, we aim to find two important quantities. First, we want to find the honest cost, ph, for Bob. This is the rate at
which Charlie would find mismatches even if Bob acts honestly. This situation occurs when Charlie erroneously rules out the
state that Alice actually sent. The experimentally found probability of this happening is given by the diagonal elements of C,
and so the honest cost is simply the average of the diagonal elements, giving ph = 8.61 × 10−5. This rate is important for two
reasons: first, the parameter sa must be set higher than ph for the protocol to be robust (to avoid aborting due to noise in the
honest run); second, to be secure against forging ph must be smaller than the rate at which Charlie finds mismatches if Bob is
dishonest; i.e., being dishonest must carry some positive cost for Bob.
We now consider the case of a dishonest Bob who tries to guess Alice’s signature so that he can forge a message to Charlie. We
consider only individual and collective forging attacks, where Bob acts on each quantum state individually, but the outcome of his
measurement on one quantum state can affect his choice of measurement on the others. Security against coherent forging attempts
remains an open question. We want to find Cmin, the minimum possible rate that Bob will declare single signature elements which
have been eliminated by Charlie. To do this, we use the cost matrix C and note that Cmin is the minimum cost associated with
the matrix C. Finding minimum costs involves finding optimal measurements, which is in general a difficult problem. However,
we are able to bound Cmin following the method in Ref. [13]. To do this, we find the matrices Ch, C ′, and C l , with
Ch =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
8.41 × 10−5 8.41 × 10−5 8.41 × 10−5 8.41 × 10−5
6.31 × 10−5 6.31 × 10−5 6.31 × 10−5 6.31 × 10−5
1.53 × 10−4 1.53 × 10−4 1.53 × 10−4 1.53 × 10−4
4.49 × 10−5 4.49 × 10−5 4.49 × 10−5 4.49 × 10−5
⎞
⎟⎟⎠.
This is a constant-row matrix made up of the diagonal elements of the matrix C. The minimum cost achievable for this matrix
is the honest cost, ph. The matrix
C ′ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0 1.40 × 10−3 1.92 × 10−3 1.02 × 10−3
1.09 × 10−3 0 1.15 × 10−3 2.78 × 10−3
2.26 × 10−3 1.75 × 10−3 0 1.15 × 10−3
1.11 × 10−3 2.72 × 10−3 1.11 × 10−3 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
is the difference betweenC andCh. It represents the difference between an honest strategy and a dishonest strategy. The minimum
cost for this matrix is the minimum additional cost suffered from acting dishonestly. It is difficult to find the minimum cost for this
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matrix, so instead we can bound it below by reducing all nonzero elements to the the smallest nonzero element, to get the matrix
C l =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0 1.02 × 10−3 1.02 × 10−3 1.02 × 10−3
1.02 × 10−3 0 1.02 × 10−3 1.02 × 10−3
1.02 × 10−3 1.02 × 10−3 0 1.02 × 10−3
1.02 × 10−3 1.02 × 10−3 1.02 × 10−3 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎠.
The matrix C l corresponds to a lower bound on the additional
probability Bob has of causing a mismatch if he is dishonest,
when compared to the honest case. For this reason we
define the constant, nonzero element, as guad, the guaranteed
advantage an honest strategy has over a dishonest strategy.
Since Chij + C lij  Cij , the minimum cost of Ch + C l must be
less than the minimum cost ofC. The matrixC l is of error type,
so its minimum cost is proportional to pmin(α), the minimum
error probability, and can be achieved using a minimum-error
measurement [19]. Since the optimal measurement is known,
in this case, to be the square-root measurement (SRM), we can
calculate pmin(α) for all values of α from
pmin(α) = 1 − 116
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
√
λi
∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
where
λ1 = 2e−|α|
2 [cos(|α|2) + cosh(|α|2)],
λ2 = 2e−|α|
2 [sin(|α|2) + sinh(|α|2)],
λ3 = 2e−|α|
2 [cosh(|α|2) − cos(|α|2)],
λ4 = 2e−|α|
2 [sinh(|α|2) − sin(|α|2)].
Defining the gap, g = pmin × guad, we know ph + g 
Cmin. For the particular case of |α|2 = 0.4, pmin = 0.317 and
we obtain
ph + g = 8.61 × 10−5 + (0.317 × 1.02 × 10−3)
= 4.10 × 10−4  Cmin.
This is our lower bound on Cmin, and in what follows we
conservatively assume Cmin = ph + g. As long as we choose
sv < Cmin, we can use [46] to obtain
Pr(Forge)  exp[−(Cmin − sv)2L]. (B3)
Note that for simplicity we have only considered the
case of Bob attempting to forge. We should also consider
the possibility of Charlie trying to forge. In this case, we
would replace the cost matrix (B2) with the corresponding
experimentally generated cost matrix for Charlie. The analysis
then follows exactly as above and we would arrive at another
value of Cmin, valid for when Charlie is the forger. For the
protocol to be secure against both Bob and Charlie attempting
to forge, we would choose Cmin = min{CBobmin ,CCharliemin }. For
our implementation, CBobmin < CCharliemin and so Cmin remains
as above.
4. Robustness
Suppose all parties are honest. Bob aborts if either the L/2
states received from Alice result in mismatch rate greater than
sa or the measurement results for the L/2 states received from
Charlie give mismatch rate greater than sa . We suppose that
the channel from Alice to Bob has an error rate of pBh and the
channel from Alice to Charlie has an error rate of pCh . Then
we have
Pr(Abort due to Alice)  exp [−(sa − pBh )2L],
Pr(Abort due to Charlie)  exp [−(sa − pCh )2L].
If we set ph = max(pBh ,pCh ) then the probability of an honest
abort is bounded by
Pr(honest abort)  2 exp[−(sa − ph)2L]. (B4)
5. Signature length
Using the above analysis, we can calculate the length of
the signature needed to securely sign a single-bit message.
Following Ref. [13], we assume that there is no reason in
general to favor one type of security over another, so we
pick parameters sa and sv so as to make the probabilities of
honest abort, forgery, and repudiation all equal. If all these
probabilities are all below 0.01%, we say that the protocol is
secure to a level of 0.01%. By setting
sa = ph + g/4, sv = ph + 3g/4, (B5)
the probabilities of repudiation, forging, and honest abort all
become approximately equal. More explicitly, considering the
terms in the exponent of equations (B1), (B3), and (B4), we
see that they are equal when(
sv − sa
2
)2
−
ln(2)
L
= (Cmin − sv)2
= (sa − ph)2 − ln(2)
L
, (B6)
where the prefactors of 2 have been taken inside the exponen-
tial. As L increases, the choice of sa and sv satisfying Eq. (B6)
tends to those given in Eq. (B5).
Determining the value of the coherent state amplitude,
α, that leads to the smallest possible signature length is, in
general, a difficult problem, especially for a real experimental
situation. Higher values of |α|2 lead to lower loss and a
smaller bit error rate but come at the cost of making the states
{|α〉,|iα〉,|−α〉,|−iα〉} more distinguishable for a potential
forger. Thus we need to strike a balance between correctly
transmitting the states and giving power to a forger. In the
previous QDS experiment [13], the magnitude of α was
varied in increments of 1 between 1 and 10. In order to
minimize the signature length, the magnitude of α is chosen
so as to maximise the gap, g, defined above. It was found
that |α|2 = 1 gave the largest gap for the range considered,
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and extrapolation of subsequent experimental data suggested
that |α|2 ≈ 0.5 would be optimal. In fact, we found in this
experiment that the optimal value was around |α|2 = 0.4, for
which the corresponding value of pmin is 0.317.
We now have everything in place to calculate the signature
length, L, needed to securely sign a message for |α|2 = 0.4.
Over a distance of 500 m, experimental data give the honest
cost as ph = max(pBh ,pCh ) = 1.26 × 10−4. Note that this
differs from the value used in the analysis above because in fact
Charlie’s cost matrix gave a higher honest cost than Bob’s. We
also find Cmin = min{CBobmin ,CCharliemin } = 4.10 × 10−4, as above.
This gives the gap,g = Cmin − ph = 2.84 × 10−4, from which
we can find the parameters sa,sv using Eq. (B5). Putting it all
together, we find that a signature length of L = 1.96 × 109 is
required to sign a message to a security level of 0.01%.
Although this is a significant improvement over the last
QDS experiment [13], there are a number of ways to further
improve the efficiency of the protocol. The simplest would
be to increase the clock rate and therefore the transmission
rate. This would not decrease the signature length but would
decrease the time needed to transmit a given signature length.
The pulse rate used in this QDS system was 100 MHz, and
there is scope to increase this to >1 GHz as is typically found
in modern QKD systems [25,47–49]. Despite the clock rate
increasing by a factor of 10, the increased effects of inter- and
intrasymbol interference mean that the corresponding decrease
in the signature time will not be as great as a factor of 10. The
exact improvement strongly depends on the characteristics of
the employed coherent source, single-photon detectors, and
timing electronics.
Another possible improvement would be to switch to an
operational wavelength of 1550 nm as in Ref. [47], rather
than the 850 nm used in this experiment. At 1550 nm, we
would expect to see losses of about 0.22 dB per kilometer, a
significant improvement over the 2.2 dB per kilometer in the
current setup. This switch in wavelengths would enable a new
QDS experiment to be carried out over tens of kilometers with
similar performance to our QDS system at short distances. A
wavelength of 850 nm was selected for these experiments
as it provides a good compromise between the detection
efficiency response of the mature, low-noise, low-timing-
jitter, high-efficiency, thick-junction, silicon single-photon
avalanche diodes at room temperature and the attenuation
profile of fused silica optical fibers.
As the system used in these experiments is similar in layout
to that used in a number of QKD experiments, we can make
an approximate comparison of the performance of our QDS
system with that of a state-of-the-art QKD system [47] by
examining the quantum bit error rate (QBER). Reducing the
QBER would decrease the size of the diagonal elements in
the cost matrix (B2). This would lead to a larger gap, g, and
therefore a smaller signature. There is perhaps less scope for
improvement in this respect since the current setup achieved a
QBER of around 4% over the range of distances investigated,
which is comparable to the QKD system in Ref. [47] where
the QBER at 50 km was 3.85%. The differing achievable
transmission distances between the work presented here and
Ref. [47] is largely due to the increased loss of the fused silica
optical fibers for light with a wavelength of 850 nm.
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